{"product_id":"conversation-and-responsibility-paperback","title":"Conversation and Responsibility - Paperback","description":"\u003cp\u003eby \u003cb\u003eMichael McKenna\u003c\/b\u003e (Author)\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn this book Michael McKenna advances a new theory of moral responsibility, one that builds upon the work of P. F. Strawson. As McKenna demonstrates, moral responsibility can be explained on analogy with a conversation. The relation between a morally responsible agent and those who hold her morally responsible is similar to the relation between a speaker and her audience. A responsible agent's actions are bearers of meaning--agent meaning--just as a speaker's utterances are bearers of speaker meaning. Agent meaning is a function of the moral quality of the will with which the agent acts. Those who hold an agent morally responsible for what she does do so by responding to her as if in a conversation. By responding with certain morally reactive attitudes, such as resentment or indignation, they thereby communicate their regard for the meaning taken to be revealed in that agent's actions. It is then open for the agent held responsible to respond to those holding her responsible by\u003cbr\u003eoffering an apology, a justification, an excuse, or some other response, thereby extending the evolving conversational exchange. \u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c\/p\u003eThe conversational theory of moral responsibility that McKenna develops here accepts two features of Strawson's theory: that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal--so that being responsible must be understood by reference to the nature of holding responsible--and that the moral emotions are central to holding responsible. While upholding these two aspects of Strawson's theory, McKenna's theory rejects a further Strawsonian thesis, which is that holding morally responsible is more fundamental or basic than being morally responsible. On the conversational theory, the conditions for holding responsible are dependent on the nature of the agent who is responsible. So holding responsible cannot be more basic than being responsible. Nevertheless, the nature of the agent who is morally responsible is to be understood in terms of sensitivity to those who would make moral demands of her, thereby holding her responsible. Being responsible is therefore also dependent on holding\u003cbr\u003eresponsible. Thus, neither being nor holding morally responsible is more basic than the other. They are mutually dependent.\u003cbr\u003e\u003ch3\u003eAuthor Biography\u003c\/h3\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eMichael McKenna\u003c\/strong\u003e is Professor of Philosophy and Keith Lehrer Chair, University of Arizona.\u003cbr\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003eNumber of Pages:\u003c\/strong\u003e 260\u003c\/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003eDimensions:\u003c\/strong\u003e 0.7 x 9.1 x 6.1 IN\u003c\/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\n\u003cstrong\u003ePublication Date:\u003c\/strong\u003e October 01, 2018\u003c\/div\u003e","brand":"Books by splitShops","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":42724630003775,"sku":"9780190857783","price":92.34,"currency_code":"USD","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0105\/8226\/1823\/files\/c3c01ac9707f87bdb98ca8138d39f843_770e7efd-6279-41fb-aa78-a050f1dfbe57.webp?v=1765103344","url":"https:\/\/dhl-adrianne.myshopify.com\/products\/conversation-and-responsibility-paperback","provider":"BBB","version":"1.0","type":"link"}